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PREFERENCE, RATIONAL CHOICE AND ARROW'S THEOREM· 
I T seems intuitively plausible to expect of a consistent rational agent that if he preferred an alternative x to another alternative 
y and y to a third alternative z then he would still prefer x to y 
if z suddenly became unavailable or y to z if x suddenly became un­
available or x to z if y became unavailable. Similarly, if he was 
given a choice only between x and y and expressed a preference for 
,x over y, we should expect that, if a third alternative z became 
available, x would still be preferred to y. As a consequence, we 
should expect that, if x is the most preferred alternative from a set S 
of alternatives, then x would be the most preferred alternative from 
any subset of S of which x is a member; that is, we should expect 
the following sentence to be true: 
("itx){x £ Sl C S2 - [x £ C(S2) - x £ C(SI)]} 
where x ranges over alternatives, Sl and S2 are sets of alternatives, 
and C(S) denotes the value of a function (called a "choice func­
tion") from S to the alternative(s) in S that is (are) preferred at least 
as much as any other alternative in S. To remain consistent with 
the literature on social choice theory, I shall follow A. K. Sen 1 in 
referring to this as "property a." 
It is easy to see why property a is a fundamental assumption in 
virtually all the literature on rational preference and social choice. 
Consider the case in which an individual is asked to give a prefer­
ence ordering over three political candidates A, B, and C. If he 
prefers A to Band B to C and A dies, then if no third candidate en­
ters the race he should vote for B. If he, in fact, votes for C, then, it 
would seem, this must be because he has just changed his mind or 
• I am grateful to Ellis Crasnow, David Gauthier, James Kahan, Sharon Labrot, 
Stephen Schiffer, Robert Schultz, and Bas van Fraassen for their comments on ear· 
lier versions of this paper. 
I Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco: Holden·Day, 1970). 
0022·362X/SI/7S12/077S$00.SO © The Journal of Philosophy, Inc. 
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because the death of A has triggered some complex chain of events 
(for example, it was discovered th.at B killed A) that call for a major 
reappraisal or because his ordering over A, B, and C was misre­
corded initially or because of. some other such factor outside the 
domain of rational preference. 
I shall, however, present a case in which property a is violated 
for none of these reasons, but rather for purely rational reasons. 
Such a counterexample should be of intrinsic interest, since prop­
erty a seems such a minimal constraint to place upon rational 
preference and choice. Beyond this, however, is a point of specific 
interest; for the basic intuition that underlies property a is also the 
basic intuition behind one of the conditions necessary to prove Ar­
row's impossibility theorem. The connection between Arrow's 
theorem and my counterexample to property a will be discussed in 
section II of this paper. 
I 
Consider a game in which two players A and B, who are prohibited 
from communicating with each other, match coins against a bank. 
They may show heads, tails, or nothing. The payoffs, with A's 
shown first, are: 
B B B 
shows shows shows 
heads nothing tails 
A 
shows 2,2 -1,-1 -1,-1 
heads 
A 
shows -1,-1 I, I -1,-1 
nothing 
A 
shows -1,-1 -1,-1 2,2 
tails 
Probability theory dictates that in this situation two ideally ra­
tional agents seeking to maximize their expected utility should set­
tle upon a pair of strategies that will result in an undominated 
equilibrium outcome. In this game there are three equilibrium 
outcomes: (1) A and B showing heads, (2) A and B showing noth­
ing, and (3) A and B showing tails. Outcome 2, however, is domi­
nated by 1 and by 3. 
Beyond the straightforward calculation, however, there is a cer­
tain epistemic complication pointed out by David Gauthier which 
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he calls "accessibility.,,2 Although 2 is dominated by both I and 3, 
these two outcomes are inaccessible. Without communication 
neither A nor B can form any expectation about which of the two 
equally appealing outcomes the other will shoot for, and, without 
such an expectation, playing either heads or tails commits one to a 
50 per cent chance of receiving 2 and a 50 per cent chance of receiv­
ing -1. Thus, playing either heads or tails becomes a bad gamble, 
and, since we are assuming A and B to be ideally rational, they 
should both realize this and show nothing in order to guarantee 
themselves a return of 1. 
So A and B should both prefer showing nothing to showing 
either heads or tails, and, in addition, both should be indifferent 
between showing heads and showing tails. Let us represent these 
preference orderings as follows: 
A B 
nothing nothing 
heads-tails heads-tails 
Now let us consider the same coin-matching game, but this time 
A is allowed to use only two of his original strategies: showing 
heads and showing nothing. The payoff matrix for this version of 
the game is: 
B 
shows 
heads 
B 
shows 
nothing 
B 
shows 
tails 
A 
shows 
heads 
2,2 -1,-1 -1,-1 
A 
shows -1,-1 1,1 -1,-1 
nothing 
Since showing nothing is the rational choice in the set of alterna­
tives {showing heads, showing nothing, showing tails}, property a 
requires that it be the rational choice in the set {showing heads, 
showing nothing}; but obviously this is false! In this second ver­
sion of the game, A and B showing heads dominates A and B show­
ing nothing, and, since A can't show tails (and B knows this), both 
A and B should expect the other to show heads. In other words, A 
2 "The Impossibility of Rational Egoism," this JOURNAL, LXXI (Aug. 15, 1974): 
439-456, p. 448. Gauthier introduces the notion of accessibility in the context of the 
same coin-matching game that I have used. 
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and B showing heads is an accessible dominating equilibrium out­
come, So, in this second version of the game, the preference order­
ings become representable as: 
A B 
heads heads 
nothing nothing 
tails 
Note that not only has A's ordering been changed, but B's has 
also-and this is just because one of A's alternatives has been 
removed. 
It is very important to note that it is just the removal of the al­
ternative that brings on the reordering; for this fact separates the 
present case from that mentioned earlier in which a person who 
originally prefers three political candidates in order A-B-C winds 
up voting for C rather than B, who is still in the race for office in 
spite of the fact that he has been charged with the murder of A. In 
this case the reordering from A-B-C to C-B is not brought on just 
because the alternative of voting for A is removed, but rather be­
cause it is removed in a certain way, and obviously it is unreason­
able to expect property Q to hold regardless of what chain of events 
is triggered in the process of removing an alternative. In other 
words, property Q should be expected to hold all things being 
equal, not come what may. 
One might want to object to my counterexample on the grounds 
that the reordering brought about there is not just a result of re­
moving a single alternative, that by removing an alternative <?ne 
somehow changes the game. But this claim is simply not true. The 
rules that define the game and specify payoffs could be set out 
without any mention of which alternative strategies each player 
must have or, for that matter, without even specifying that every 
player have a coin (since a player can show nothing). 
There is another possible objection which isn't very good but I'll 
mention it anyway. One might claim that I have done something 
illicit by considering preference relations over strategies rather than 
outcomes. If outcomes were being considered then there would be 
no problem at all, for receiving 2 would always be preferred to re­
ceiving 1 and 1 to receiving -1. This strikes me, though, as a very 
thin hair to try to split. On one reading it attempts a distinction 
between doing something and getting something, and one need 
hardly point out that more often than not what people are trying 
to get by their actions is the opportunity to do something. On 
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another reading it attempts a distinction between instrumentally 
good alternatives and intrinsically good alternatives, but one 
would certainly not want to claim that preference relations should 
be thought to obtain only between intrinsically good alternatives; 
for then one could not prefer (strictly speaking) getting $1000 to 
getting I¢, since money is of only instrumental value. At any rate, 
one can easily devise a game in which the outcomes are directions 
to use certain strategies in a second game, in which case an out­
come just is a strategy. 
A related line of attack would insist upon a requirement that, 
whatever kind of alternatives can bear binary preference relations 
to each other, the only kind that decision theory should concern it­
self with are those with some kind of determinate value. Since the 
alternatives in my counterexample are strategies in a gamble, they 
do not have determinate values. In the first place, since the game in 
my counterexample is between two ideally rational players (and 
each knows that he is playing with an ideally rational player), their 
chosen strategies do have determinate outcomes (How else could I 
have known them?). Secondly, this requirement is too harsh any­
way, since, as anyone who has tried to buy anything lately knows, 
not even money is of determinate value. 
II 
Basically, the strategy behind the Arrow impossibility theorem is 
to list some intuitively plausible constraints (or "conditions") that 
any method of arriving at social choices on the basis of individual 
preferences (which Arrow calls a "social welfare function"-or 
SWF) should satisfy and then show that these conditions are incon­
sistent and, thus, that no SWF can possibly meet them. Informally, 
three of the four conditions necessary in order to prove the Arrow 
theorem are: 
(I) 	The SWF must supply a social ordering for every logically 
possible combination of individual preference orderings 
over any given set of alternatives (unrestricted domain). 
(2) 	 If everyone in the society prefers x to y, then the SWF must 
result in a social ordering of x over y (Pareto principle). 
(3) 	The SWF cannot specify that the preferences of a single 
individual determines a social ordering on every issue 
regardless of the preferences of everyone else (non­
dictatorship) . 
The fourth condition is of special importance here; so it will be 
stated formally: 
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(4) 	 Let RI, ... , Rn and RI', ... ,Rn' be two sets of individual 
orderings, and let C(S) and C'(S) be the corresponding 
social choice functions. If, for all individuals i and all 
alternatives x and y in a given environment S, XRiY if and 
only if xR;'y, then C(S) and C'(S) are the same (independ­
ence of irrelevant alternatives). 3 
The notation 'xR.y' here should be read "individual i prefers x at 
least as much as y." Informally, what is being required by this 
condition is that the social ordering derived from a given set (or 
"environment") S of individual orderings be unaffected by the ex­
istence of orderings over alternatives not in S. 
The effect of this requirement is twofold. First, it rules out the 
interjection of nonfeasible alternatives into lists of feasible ones in 
order to determine interpersonal comparisons of strengths of pref­
erence. For example, given that a choice is to be made between two 
alternatives x and y in a society of two individuals A and Band 
that A prefers x to y and B prefers y to x, we would think it reason­
able to say that the society as a whole is indifferent between x and 
y. If, however, we were to interject the set of nonfeasible alterna­
tives {+$1000, +$1, -$1, -$1000} into the set of feasible ones {x, y} 
and A's and B's orderings were then representable as follows: 
A B 
+$1000 Y 
+$1 +$1000 
x +$1 
y -$1 
-$1 -$1000 
-$1000 x 
then it would seem reasonable to say that y should be the social 
choice, since B strongly prefers y to x and A just barely prefers x to 
y. But the independence condition rules out this change of mind 
from our original finding that society should be indifferent be­
tween x and y.4 Since the choice-in fact-involves only x and y, it 
3 Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed. (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale, 1963), p. 27. Parenthetical page references hereafter will be to this 
book. Arrow's original proof used five conditions. I am following Sen in using only 
four. The numbers I have assigned to the four conditions do not correspond to those 
used by Arrow. 
'This problem with the independence condition is noted by R. Duncan Luce and 
Howard Rai££a in Games and Decisions (New York: Wiley, 1957), p. 341. 
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should, according to the independence condition, be independent 
of alternatives that cannot-in fact-be chosen. The essential point 
of this requirement is, as Arrow puts it, to reinforce the principle 
that "Only observable differences can be used as a basis for expla­
nation" (109). He continues, 
Given the set of alternatives available for society to choose among, it 
could be expected that, ideally, one could observe all preferences 
among the available alternatives, but there would be no way to ob­
serve preferences among alternatives not feasible for society (110). 
The second effect of this condition is to enforce a certain concep­
tion of rationality which holds "that the choice to be made from 
any set alternatives can be determined by the choices made between 
pairs of alternatives" (20). Stated alternatively, 
Knowing the social choices made in pairwise comparisons ... deter­
mines the entire social ordering and therewith the social choice func­
tion C (S) for all possible environments (28). 
The usual course pursued by those who would take Arrow to 
task on the independence condition is to attack the condition be­
cause of its first effect, arguing either that Arrow's presupposed 
constraints on observability are too harsh and that empirically 
respectable methods of determining preference strength do existS 
or-as John Harsanyi does-that the whole business of firmly 
shackling explanation to observables is "a result of uncritical ac­
ceptance of a seriously mistaken-and by now completely super­
seded-philosophical doctrine, that of logical positivism.,,6 The 
case made by either of these arguments is quite strong. As for the 
first, although it may be difficult-in practice-to ascertain 
strengths of preferences by interjecting nonfeasible alternatives, it 
is not difficult to suppose that-in principle-such information 
can be reliably obtained, and, at least in those cases when it can be 
obtained, it should be used-or, at least, not disregarded as a matter 
of principle. The power of Harsanyi's line of argument is, I think, 
fairly obvious, given the general turn away from positivism in the 
last few decades, and he has convinced many people working in the 
field of social decision theory to see things his way. 
Whatever the strengths or weaknesses of these attacks, however, 
mine is an attack on the other front. What is called into question 
S Several suggestions about how strengths of preferences can be calculated and 
amalgamated within various sets of constraints on observability are discussed by 
Luce and Raiffa, pp. 345-353. 
6 "Bayesian Decision Theory, Rule Utilitarianism, and Arrow's Impossibility 
Theorem," Theory and /Jecision, XI, 3 (September 1979): 289-317, p. 302. 
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by my counterexample to property a is the whole conception of ra­
tional preference formation which it and the independence condi­
tion are intended to capture. In particular, I am arguing that, in 
general, when a fully rational agent arrives at a choice from a set S 
of alternatives, he is not necessarily asserting anything at all about 
what his second, third, or fourth choices would be if his first choice 
became nonfeasible, and, likewise, that when he gives his pairwise 
comparisons over all the two-member subsets of S, he is not neces­
sarily asserting anything at all about his choice from S. Given, 
then, that this conception of rationality seems to be missing some­
thing at the level of individual choice, it is not at all clear why we 
should try to impose it at the level of social choice by requiring the 
condition of the independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
It should be pointed out that arguments against the independ­
ence condition like mine were, to some extent, anticipated by 
Arrow; for he realized that 
... the model of rational choices as built up from pair-wise compari­
sons does not seem to suit well the case of rational behavior in the ... 
game situation .... The precise shape of a formulation of rationality 
which takes ... [game-theoretic considerations] into account or the 
consequences of such. a reformulation on the theory of choice in gen­
eral or the theory of social choice in particular cannot be foreseen; but 
it is at least a possibility, to which attention should be drawn, that the 
paradox discussed below [Arrow's theorem] might be resolved by such 
a broader concept of rationality (20/21). 
Although the point of divergence between the game-theoretic con­
ception of rational choice and Arrow's conception which I have 
pointed out is not the same as the one Arrow noticed,7 I think it 
fair to say that what I have done here is to press the basic issue with 
which Arrow was concerned. 
TAL SCRIVEN 
University of Southern California 
California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo 
7 The point of dissimilarity in question which Arrow noticed was that in a game 
situation the environment from which an agent must choose contains an infinite 
number of alternatives, since any environment that contains more than one strategy 
also contains all the possible randomizations over those strategies. Thus, a choice 
could not be produced by pairwise comparisons, for there are infinitely many of 
them to make. See Arrow, p. 20. 
